Appendix: Proofs of all results
, where To solve (P), we thus focus on the case when Ar < Am. 
Integrating by parts and canceling common terms, we get: will look at a general cost function of the following form:
Since the sum of convex functions is convex, to show that ( , ) J Q r is jointly convex, it suffices to
Let H(Q, r) be the Hessian matrix of b (Q, r 
The diagonal terms of this Hessian H(Q, r) are again positive. Also, note that
This implies convexity.
Observation 3.1: Using equations (8) and (9) in section 3, we have
It is immediate that in general, there is no such that Q V = Q C and r V = r C simultaneously.
Theorem 3.1: (1) We will start with the case where a penalty is incurred for every stockout occasion. We need to show that there exists a rent such that ( , ) ( , )
We will demonstrate this by taking two cases.
Case 1: Let Am/Pm Ar/Pr. Consider a rent such that r V = r R = r. From (5) and (8), we have
Taking the difference and canceling common terms, we have,
Rearranging terms and canceling common ones, we have,
Note that the expression in [.] is positive because P r P m . Since our choice of rent implies that
Case 2: Let Am/Pm < Ar/Pr.
Consider a rent such that Q V = Q R = Q. As before, taking the difference and canceling common terms, we have: 
is a convex function and has a unique minimum at x = y/(y+1) < 1. Further, G(y) = 0 and P m /P r = y 1. G(x) has another zero at some x* < y. Hence, it is easy to see that G(x) 0 when x [x*, y] and is positive everywhere else. By our assumption x y. To finish the proof, we need to ensure that x x*. As y increases, x* decreases. When y = 1, we get x*= 0.203 and this corresponds to A r = 4.9A m . Hence, if A r 5A m , we can ensure that G(x) 0.
(2) Now consider the case where a penalty cost for a stockout is incurred for every unit stocked out. In this case, the total cost of the supply chain is:
The only difference in the cost function is that we have n(r) instead of ).
. So, it can be shown easily that the only difference in the proof for this case, relative to the earlier one, is that we replace ) (r F with n(r) and f(r) with ) (r F . 
Theorem 4.1:
We analyze the case when the production rate is greater than D but finite. As mentioned in the discussion following Theorem 4.1, the case of infinite production simply yields X=0 in the discussion below.
To prove (1) we need only produce a pair ( ,  ) that results in channel coordination. ). But we do not claim that this solution can allocate fractions of the savings such that the participants do better than in a RMI system. However, combined with side payments, the contract can allocate the first best profit arbitrarily to the players.
To prove (2), we produce a ( ,  ) 0 such that both players are better in the VMI system than in the RMI system. We will represent the manufacturer's optimal response in the VMI system by (Q V ,r V ), which satisfies equation (A1) above.
We will denote by (Q R , r R ) the decisions made by the retailer in an RMI system. The player's costs in the VMI and RMI systems are denoted, as before, by , , , and
We need to show that there exists a contract S 1 or equivalently a pair ( ,  ) such that 0
Note that the expression for Q R is the same as when the production rate was infinite.
So, for any > 0, there exists > 0 such that
and writing Y as a function of  : (1) of the lemma is straightforward, so we will prove part (2) of the lemma.,
Without any loss of generality and for ease of exposition, we ignore the constant multiplier βin the demand density function in the proof.
To show joint convexity, we need the positive definiteness of the Hessian.
Let the Hessian matrix be denoted by Theorem 5.1: The total supply chain cost of the system as a function of (s, T) is given by:
This total system cost function will be used to compare the two systems, VMI and RMI, though the values of (s, T) would be different in the two cases. From Lemma 5.1, we have convexity of the cost function. Convexity of the cost function implies that the optimal decisions can be obtained by solving simultaneously the two first order conditions. Again, without any loss of generality, we ignore the constant multiplier βin the demand density function for ease of exposition. So, we have:
To analyze the VMI system, we need only set A = A m , H = and P = P m in (A2) and (A3 
